policies should create and facilitate adoption of universal standards and best practices to ensure a safe global food supply, supported as it is by the World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization, specialized U.N. agencies with well-regarded research capacity and public health-oriented mandates. Yet Codex has been the subject of substantial criticism for failing to uphold its consumer protection mandate.
Using the principal common criticisms of Codex-that it favors trade liberalization over health, industry concerns over consumers', and rich countries over poor ones-this article encourages FDA to leverage its new role as a global regulatory body to inform its Codex work. This article contributes to the existing literature by clarifying the scope and gravity of these common criticisms and showing how FDA may use them to anticipate the changes global trade liberalization portends for keeping the food supply safe. First, Codex's lean toward trade liberalization over consumer health did not commence after it became the international standard-setting organization under the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPS). From its structure to its purpose, Codex processes have always favored trade liberalization over high levels of health protection. Emphasizing Codex's emergence from relative obscurity after 1994 distracts from the political and economic forces that have shaped the organization from its founding and the infrastructure WHO, FAO and Codex have put in place to ensure those forces are harnessed to the greatest extent possible to further the organization's mission.
Second, studies and analyses of Codex decision-making frequently accuse it of subordinating its agenda to industry interests. For the most part, these criticisms are proven indirectly by, for example, counting industry representatives at Codex meetings or as part of national delegations. But the real threats to the integrity of Codex's processes have emerged not through routine industry participation on national delegations or as observers, but through hidden efforts to influence scientists supplying Codex's committees and subcommittees with purportedly objective information. The response to that threat is better systems for declarations of interest and transparency, an effort FDA is well positioned to lead. Third, critics accuse Codex of undertaking its work with insufficient participation by developing countries or inadequate sensitivity to their resource constraints. But, other than the argument that participation matters for its own sake, there has been little investigation as to concrete harms to developing countries by existing levels of participation. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the problems for developing countries are not caused by Codex, but by developed countries' insistence on imposing standards more stringent than Codex adopts or allowing private entities to effectively push standards higher through supply agreements.
It is reasonable to assume that, if the Doha trade round ever results in freer trade in agricultural goods, Codex will be a prime target for erecting barriers to entry for those goods not necessarily related to its consumer health protection mandate. These weaknesses in the current Codex standard development process are outlined with the objective of informing FDA's approach to determining which Codex standards have been effectively and responsibly informed and, if so, how they may be harmonized with U.S. law. This article is part of a larger story about how FDA's mandateprotection of U.S. consumers' health-will adapt as rules it adopts will be subject to challenge under international trade and investment treaties.
Part II of this Article provides a brief history of Codex and how its members are chosen as well as the general nature of its activities. Part III outlines the three common criticisms of Codex and how FDA may address each within the scope of its new FSMA authority. Part IV provides a brief conclusion and preview of how FDA's role must adapt in the face of the increasing strength of international trade and investment treaties.
II. THE HISTORY AND FUNCTION OF THE CODEX COMMISSION

A. CODEX'S HISTORY AND STRUCTURE
The history of Codex dates back to the creations of the FAO and WHO in the late 1940s.1 In 1950, the FAO and WHO formed the First Joint Expert Committee on Nutrition ("Joint Expert Committee"), emphasizing the need to address the inconsistencies of international food standards. In 1955, the Fourth Joint Expert Committee declared the uncontrolled use of food additives a pressing matter of public concern and established a committee to draft guidelines on food additive control and use.
The Joint Expert Committee joined a number of international and regional food regulatory agencies that had evolved in the post-war period. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, for example, established a Geneva Protocol which proposed standards and guidelines for food commodities, mainly fruits and vegetables. The FAO/WHO Committee of Governmental Experts worked with the International Dairy Federation to implement milk quality and labeling requirements. Europe had worked out a region-wide harmonization system, the Codex Alimentarius Europaeus, based on a model developed under the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. The Codex Alimentarius Commission's main authoritative organ is its Executive Committee ("Executive Committee"), which consists of seventeen members drawn from both Codex's general membership and regional representatives.28 The Executive Committee manages the development of committee standards and guidelines, and develops strategic plans for implementation.29 Typically, the Executive Committee combines such submissions with those of lower level subcommittees for Commission consensus or vote.30 The Executive Committee may exercise the Commission's powers 31 to appoint subcommittee officials or implement Commission approved standards. Commission votes often are conducted by secret ballot, and while Codex custom, like that of other international organizations, stresses consensus,32it has adopted several standards through secret ballot applying majority vote (sometimes narrowly so) for such decisions.
3 3 The Codex Secretariat facilitates communications between members, committees, and the commission.34
Beneath the Codex's executive and administrative organs sit four subsidiary bodies responsible for developing the standards to be reviewed by the Commission and Executive Committee.
3 5 These subsidiary bodies create subcommittees to develop The first subsidiary body contains Codex's General Subject Committees.
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Currently, the General Subject Committees consist of ten subcommittees that develop generally applicable principles. 40 The General Subcommittees are commonly called "horizontal committees" because their work applies broadly to all foods. 4 1 As the chief subsidiary body, the General Subcommittees assist the Executive Committee in reviewing and endorsing standards derived from other committees and subcommittees. Horizontal committees focus on health and safety recommendations such as food hygiene, additives or contaminants, labeling, and inspection systems. The General Subcommittees develop such standards and recommendations based on the advice of 42 expert scientific bodies.
The Commission's second grouping of subsidiary bodies are called Commodity Committees and are responsible for the largest number of specific standards.
4 3 The Commodity Committees are also known as "vertical committees" because, unlike the General Subcommittees, the Commodity Committees are restricted in focus and responsibilities. These committees research and develop proposals for standards in non-individualized food products such as fats and oils, milk and milk products, processed fruits and vegetables, and sugars. Commodity Committees are created as needed to address particular issues in such food categories. The Commodity Committees have integrated NGOs into standard development. Frequently, NGOs combine to shoulder the workload of certain Commodity Committees, which occasionally leads the NGO groupings to become subcommittees themselves.
Codex has also developed a process by which "Ad Hoc Task Forces" may be formed for specific purposes and a limited time. 5 An Ad Hoc Task Force's scope is narrower than that of a Commodity Committee; Ad Hoc Task Forces are assembled to create guidelines for one or more specific issues within a subgroup of a food category already covered by general or commodity committees. 46 Ad Hoc Task Forces originated in 1999 when the Commission realized that its rigid committee structure was incapable of the flexibility required to meet the volatile and ever-increasing demands for additional standards. To be fair to critics, Codex and its participants have done little to diminish the appearance of imbalance toward trade or industry influence. Codex's structure has always leaned in favor of not only trade, but also countries with substantial interests in a given food or subject area, which Codex gives privileged status within the standardsetting process. Norway, for example, has always hosted standard-setting for fish and fishery products; China hosts the food additives and pesticide residues committees; and Switzerland hosts the now-adjourned committees on natural mineral waters and 70 cocoa or chocolate products. In each of these cases, the host country is either a leading exporter of the regulated commodity or chemical or home to major global firms.
Advancing Public Health through Codex Processes
But Codex has also incorporated international health agreements and evidence generated by the strong research capacities of WHO and FAO. Codex standards on infant formula, for example, not only tightly regulate the components of formula (e.g., vitamins, minerals, and essential nutrients) but also incorporate key aspects of the 1981 World Health Organization's International Code on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes. This is to enable regulatory authorities to require manufacturers to include labels stating the superiority of breastfeeding for infants, prohibiting pictures of infants or women that idealize formula use, and advising consumers that they should use formula only on the advice of an independent health worker, without falling afoul of the SPS Agreement. These measures may be subject to challenge, however, under another WTO agreement like TBT or TRIPS.
7 1 To be sure, that standard and standards that followed gave regulators and firms ways to circumvent the full protections of the 1981 Code. But the inclusion of these key health measures in Codex standards belies the claim that Codex cannot be used to advance the cause of global or population health or give flexibility to governments that wish to do so. Similarly, Codex standards, when read together, provide significant flexibility for governments to protect consumers' health. 
FDA's Role in Endorsing Advances in Nutrition Science
FDA is therefore well positioned to influence standard-setting in light of advances in nutrition science as assessed by both FDA and WHO. One of the ways in which consumers are consistently misled about their calorie and nutrient intake is by labels that depict nutritional information per serving even for food packages or bottled 
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beverages that are commonly consumed in a single sitting. 7 3 Codex standards largely accommodate this labeling method, and an effective way to use the Codex process to advance global health is to eliminate the option for manufacturers to provide nutritional information in unrealistic ways. Codex has a mixed record with respect to allowing advances in global population health analysis to inform its standard setting process. The aforementioned Codex standards on infant formula, for example, are relatively progressive but Codex has largely ignored the relationship between food labeling and agricultural policies on diet and health." The WHO Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity, and Health calls on Codex to undertake processes that ensure better labeling to allow more effective information about the benefits and contents of foods; measures to minimize the impact of marketing on unhealthy dietary patterns; and production and processing standards regarding the nutritional quality and safety of products. 75 WHO recommendations track to a significant extent similar conclusions reached by FDA along with other federal agencies on advice about consuming fewer calories and making informed food choices to attain and maintain a healthy weight, reduce risk of chronic disease, and 76 promote overall health. These calls have been more or less ignored, so that current
77
Codex standards may be and are effectively used to hide consumption risks. As an example, Codex standards now require the listing of ingredients in descending order according to proportion, but do not effectively limit the re-characterization or overlap of ingredients so that salts and sugars may comprise a much larger portion of a labeled food than a descending order of ingredients would lead a consumer to believe. Similarly, Codex standards for "natural flavouring substances" leave substantial flexibility to manufacturers to process any "natural material of animal or vegetable origin" through drying, torrefaction, fermentation, microbiological or enzymatic process and other methods even when those processes result in changes in the chemical structure of the flavouring. FDA's credibility when asserting the desirability of Codex standards will be jeopardized as long as Codex's processes for adopting standards appear compromised. To be clear, Codex critics are often vague as to how industry influence (and whether it is beneficial or not) is to be measured. There is wide consensus in the literature on Codex that its processes are subject to industry capture, but the primary means of proving the claim are anecdotal or derived through reference to relative participation by firms or industrial groups. An oft-quoted 1993 study conducted by the National Food Alliance found that "over eighty percent of the nongovernmental participants on national delegations to recent Codex committees represented industry, while only one It is a fair inference that greater participation of both observers and national delegates translates into greater influence, 83 but it is not always clear that influence as part of one or more delegations or as observers will move the needle on the standards as they move through the process. New Zealand's National Organisations for Fruit and Vegetable Growers and Grocery Marketers Association might both attend or participate in New Zealand's Codex processes, but advocate opposing positions for their government. 4 Codex standards as adopted by FDA will not only gain legitimacy in consumers' eyes but also better reflect the high scientific standards Codex promises if FDA adopts two principal review mechanisms for Codex standards. First, FDA should apply its own internal conflict of interest policies to its review of Codex standards with the same rigor as it applies to outside scientific advice on its current portfolio of consumer products. Because FDA is a participant in Codex standard setting, there is an implicit assumption that FDA has undertaken a full analysis of potential conflicts at the international level. FSMA's regime of reviewing conflicts of interest for third-party verification entities for food imports"' counsels in favor of stricter review of the scientific assessments that inform Codex work. Second, FDA should make the selection of non-governmental Codex representatives in the U.S. national delegation more transparent. While both steps would require FDA taking a larger leadership role within the U.S. Codex Office (now housed at USDA), there is no formal legal hindrance to these steps by FDA that FSMA implicitly authorizes or encouraged.
Breaches in Codex's Scientific Assessment Integrity
The most alarming episodes of industry influence at Codex have not occurred through routine member or observer participation at the subcommittee level in the Codex process but at WHO/FAO joint scientific committees, ostensibly neutral and highly-qualified scientific bodies whose conclusions are given substantial weight in the standard setting process. In 1990, an international tobacco research arm, Centre 7 Vettorazzi exercised his influence through the benign-sounding (Codex qualified International Non-Governmental Organization) International Toxicology Information Centre (ITIC) which was financed through "sale of its various scientific outputs" and by "Vettorazzi Associates", the entity through which CORESTA hired Vettorazzi for $100,000 per year." In internal promotional literature, ITIC touted its "counseling on matters related to the Codex Alimentarius, particularly the Codex Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants (CCFAC), the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues (CCPR) and the Codex Committee on Veterinary Drugs Residues." 89 In one promotional newsletter, it stated:
The development of a new ITIC International Safety Review is a process that requires a close interaction between the ITIC and the party interested in the safety of a specific chemical. It is this mutual collaboration that makes this program a novel and unique project. The results are objective, functional, tailored-to-the-need, scientific and credible safety reviews on commercially viable products.
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In other words, ITIC's scientific assessments and its connection to members of key WHO bodies were up for sale. Safety evaluations from ITIC included not only ETU, but zineb (registrations canceled in U.S. following EPA special review), maneb 
Opaque Relationships between Codex and Industry Coalitions
The International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) is an industry coalition organization that funds research in "pathology, toxicology, and nutrition," but the organization's Board of Members consists of one representative from each member company, most of which are global firms with a significant footprint in agrifood, food additive, and food chemical markets like Cargill, Monsanto, Mars, Coca-Cola, Nestle, PepsiCo, and Unilever. 9 3 Remarking on ILSI's mission in the face of increasing food regulation in the late 1980s, Alex Malaspina from Coca-Cola declared that "ILSI is prepared to meet [new] 
